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Lactation Litigation And The ADA Solution: 
A Response To Martinez v. NBC 
Hilary Von Rohr* 
On October 1, 1999, President Clinton signed into law a bill 
permitting breast-feeding in federal buildings.1 After Clinton signed 
the bill, many hailed its passage as a dramatic step toward reforming 
the social and legal implications surrounding a woman’s choice to 
breast-feed.2 Supporters hope that the federal law will encourage the 
demise of society’s supposedly Victorian views concerning 
motherhood and the breast.3 The federal law comes on the heels of a 
number of recently released studies extolling the health and 
psychological benefits of breast-feeding for mother and child.4 In 
almost every state, state legislators are drafting and enacting 
legislation affecting breast-feeding mothers.5 
As this wave of public legislation hits a crescendo, recent court 
decisions, in contrast to new legislation, generally tend to limit the 
breadth of rights regarding a woman’s choice to breast-feed in private 
employment, albeit on inconsistent grounds.6 In the midst of 
diverging popular sentiment and emerging federal and state law, 
 
 *   J.D., Washington University School of Law, 2000. 
 1. H.R. 1848, 106th Cong. (1999) (enacted).  
 2. Sheryl McCarthy, Feds Decriminalize Nursing of Babies, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., 
Oct. 11, 1999, at A13. 
 3. Id.  
 4. Sandra Blakeslee, Re-Evaluating Significance of Baby’s Bond With Mother, N.Y. 
T IMES, Aug. 4, 1998, at F1 (discussing the “attachment theory” which theorizes that a baby’s 
bond to its mother determines subsequent social adjustment); Isabelle Scallreuter Olsen, Out of 
the Mouths of Babes: No Mother’s Milk for U.S. Children. The Law and Breast-feeding, 19 
HAMLINE L. REV. 269, 271-74 (1995) (citing numerous studies confirming that breast-feeding 
protects mothers and children from illness and disease and also enhances children’s 
developmental and intelligence test  scores).  
 5. See infra  notes 12-21 and accompanying text.  
 6. Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927 (4th Cir. 1998); Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960 F. 
Supp. 1487 (D. Colo. 1997); Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 868 (W.D.Ky. 1990) 
aff’d, 951 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1991); Bd. of Sch. Dirs. v. Rosetti, 411 A.2d 486 (Pa. 1979).  
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private employers face uncertain and inconsistent guidance on how to 
avoid litigation by lactating employees. In Martinez v. NBC, a New 
York district court decision highlighted the inconsistencies of this 
employment law quagmire.7 The plaintiff in Martinez, a producer for 
an all-news television network, claimed that her employer failed to 
provide her with a “safe, secure, sanitary and private area to breast 
pump” and thus violated her rights under the Americans With 
Disabilities Act.8 The court denied her claim and held that the ADA 
does not cover breast-feeding mothers.9 
In light of Martinez and the new federal legislation, a private 
employer’s duty to accommodate a lactating employee is legally 
uncertain.10  This Note argues that, contrary to the Martinez decision 
and recent legislative enhancements, the ADA already provides a 
workable framework for accommodating private employees who 
choose to breast-feed.  This Note further asserts that courts hesitate to 
apply the ADA to breast-feeding employees because of the potential 
social repercussions and stigmas that may result from labeling the 
female effects of reproduction a “disability.” Although  “disability” is 
not necessarily the most preferable term, it is an adequate description 
of the condition surrounding a breast-feeding mother. Furthermore, 
applying the term “disability” will not be an assault on gender 
equality. In summary, applying the ADA to lactating employees 
furnishes stable and predictable guidelines for private employers to 
 
 7. 49 F. Supp. 2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).  
 8. Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 308; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-12213 (1994). On July 26, 1990, 
President George Bush signed the ADA into law. The statute provides comprehensive civil 
rights protection to individuals with disabilities. The ADA is divided into five titles. Title I 
covers discrimination in employment. Title II extends the prohibition against discrimination on 
the basis of disabilities to all programs, activities, and services of state and local governments or 
agencies, regardless of whether these entities receive federal financial assistance. Title II also 
covers public transportation. Title III prohibits discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities by privately-run places of public accommodation and public transportation services 
provided by private entities. Title IV covers telecommunications and Title V contains several 
miscellaneous provisions. See generally BNA, T HE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: A 
PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE TO IMPACT, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE  63-76 (1990); 
Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 TEMP. L. 
REV. 393, 397 (1991); JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO , NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A 
NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1993).  
 9. Id. at 308.  
 10. Eric Matusewitch, Workplace Lactation or Litigation? Soon, Employers May Face a 
Choice, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, August 9, 1999, at LQ2. 
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heed, while at the same time protecting a working mother’s right to 
continue her employment and motherhood simultaneously. 
Section I of this Recent Development provides the reader with a 
summary of current and recently enacted legislation affecting the 
right to breast-feed. Section II contains a historical synopsis of 
lactation litigation. Section III of this Recent Development offers a 
critique of the Martinez decision. Finally, section IV suggests a 
solution to the uncertainty regarding the legal rights of lactating 
employees. 
I. A SUMMARY OF THE CURRENTLY PROPOSED AND RECENTLY 
PASSED LEGISLATION AFFECTING BREAST-FEEDING 
Congress recently passed a federal law allowing breast-feeding in 
federal buildings, a bill that received unusually high bipartisan 
support.11 Other than this recently passed law, however, Congress 
typically leaves specific breast-feeding legislation to the discretion of 
state legislatures. 
A number of states formally recognize a woman’s right to 
publicly breast-feed.12 New York and Connecticut even have passed 
laws making interference with breast-feeding a civil rights 
violation.13 In addition to their legal implications, almost all of these 
laws specifically speak to the benefits of breast-feeding and 
encourage women to do so. Florida’s breast-feeding statute states that 
 
 11. Congress passed the Act by adding it to a bill financing the Treasury and Postal 
Service.  However, U.S. Representative Carolyn Maloney of New York originally introduced 
the bill as a separate act and named it the “Right To Breastfeed Act.”  H.R. 1848, 106th Cong. 
(1999).  Maloney sponsored the bill and currently supports two pending bills relating to women 
and breast-feeding. H.R. 1478, 106th Cong.  (1999) (amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to 
include breast-feeding by new mothers); H.R. 3531, 105th Cong. (1998) (supporting breast-
feeding by new mothers and encouraging employers to support workplace lactation programs). 
 12. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.3  (West 2000); DEL CODE. ANN. Tit . 31, § 310 (1997); FLA. 
STAT. Ch. 800.02 (1998); IDAHO CODE § 2-209 (1998) (providing that nursing mothers may be 
excused from jury duty until they are no longer nursing); IOWA CODE § 607A (1995); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 201.220 (1995); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-e (McKinney 2000); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 944.20, 948.10 (West 1999-2000). 
 13. 1997 Conn. Acts 97-210 (Reg. Sess.) (amending CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64 
(West 1995) and declaring that “[i]t shall be a discriminatory practice for a place of public 
accommodation, resort or amusement to restrict or limit the right of a mother to breast-feed her 
child.”); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-e (stating that women who are harassed for breast-feeding 
can bring a claim for damages as a civil rights violation). 
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“the breast-feeding of a baby is an important and basic act of nurture 
which must be encouraged in the interest of maternal and child health 
and family values.”14 
Most of these laws, however, do not apply to breast-feeding in the 
workplace. Only two states have enacted laws requiring employers to 
reasonably accommodate breast-feeding mothers.15 Minnesota 
requires private employers to set aside a private spot “other than a 
toilet stall” for nursing mothers who want to pump milk during 
unpaid breaks.16 In 1999 the Tennessee legislature enacted a similar 
law.17 Instead of mandating accommodation, Texas enacted the Texas 
Breast-Feeding Rights and Policies Law which encourages breast-
feeding in the workplace.18 The Texas law allows businesses that 
develop policies supporting work site breast-feeding to use the 
designation “mother friendly” or “baby friendly” in their promotional 
materials.19 Moreover, in 1998 California enacted Assembly 
Concurrent Resolution No. 155 which urges employers to provide 
support and encouragement to working mothers who want to 
continue breast-feeding.20 
While these recent legislative steps highlight the need for legal 
protection for lactating women, the assortment of current legislation 
fails to offer consistency and predictability.21 Consequently, both 
employees and employers remain unclear about their legal 
obligations and rights. 
II. A HISTORY OF LITIGATION BY LACTATING EMPLOYEES 
Lactating employees have sued their employers under a variety of 
theories, including the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (hereinafter 
 
 14. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 383.015 (West Supp. 1998).  
 15. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.939 (West 1999); T ENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-305 (1999).  
 16. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.939. 
 17. T ENN. CODE. ANN. § 50-1-305 (1999). 
 18. T EX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §165.001-.034 (Vernon Supp. 2000). 
 19. Id. at § 165.003.  
 20. CAL. CIV. CODE 43.3 (West  2000).  
 21. For example, an employer with offices in Minnesota may be required to provide an 
eight by twelve foot lactating room, while in Missouri, the same employer may only be required 
to provide a bathroom stall. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/12
p341Von Rohr.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000]  Lactation Litigation 345 
 
 
PDA),22 the ADA, the Constitution, and state laws.  Women 
employees asserting the right to breast-feed primarily base their 
action on the PDA.23 The PDA bars discrimination on the basis of 
pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions. These cases 
typically involve employees denied leaves of absence or work 
schedule modifications to accommodate breast-feeding.24 
The great majority of courts, however, hold that breast-feeding is 
not a pregnancy-related medical condition under the PDA.25 For 
example, in Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co. the district court held that an 
employee’s discharge did not constitute a termination due to a 
condition related to pregnancy or childbirth in violation of the PDA. 
The employer fired her after she did not return to work at the end of 
her maternity leave because she needed additional time to breast-feed 
her baby.26 In addition, the district court in Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, 
Inc. held that the employer did not violate the PDA when it fired a 
 
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).  In 1978 Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 “to prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.” The Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act amended the “Definitions” section of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, adding a 
new subsection (k) reading in pertinent part as follows:  
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” [in Title VII] include, but are not 
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including 
receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but 
similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this 
title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994). 
 23. Id.  
 24. See infra  notes 25-27. 
 25. Courts have construed the “related medical conditions” provision of the PDA to cover 
only those disabilities or illnesses that incapacitate the employee. Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 
789 F. Supp. 867, 869 (W.D.Ky. 1990).  In Wallace the court noted that: 
[a]dmittedly, the [PDA] does not define what const itute “related medical conditions.” 
However, the substantive references to “related medical conditions” within [the] 
legislative history are all in the context of the extent to which female employees can be 
denied medical benefits, such as sick leave and health insurance coverage, arising from 
pregnancy and childbirth . . .. Neither breast -feeding and weaning, nor difficulties 
arising therefrom, constitute such a condition . . .. If a woman wants to stay home to 
take care of the child, no benefit must be paid because this is not a medically 
determined condition related to pregnancy. 
Id. 
 26. Id.  
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woman for requesting additional leave time so that her child could 
adapt to a breast-feeding schedule compatible with her work hours.27 
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly 
recognized a constitutional right to breast-feed at work. In Dike v. 
School Board of Orange County  the court ruled that a Florida public 
school teacher’s “interest in nurturing her child by breast-feeding is 
entitled . . . to constitutional protection against state infringement 
under the Ninth and Fourteenth amendments.”28 The court compared 
breast-feeding to marriage, calling both “intimate to the degree of 
being sacred.”29 
In state courts, plaintiffs sue their employers under state civil 
rights and human rights laws. For instance, in Board of School 
Directors v. Rossetti, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected a 
public school teacher’s claim that the school board’s refusal to grant 
her a discretionary extended leave of absence to breast-feed her baby 
constituted sex discrimination under Pennsylvania’s civil rights law.30 
In a contrast, a New York court held in Bond v. Sterling, Inc. that an 
employee made out a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination 
under the New York State Human Rights law when her employer 
terminated her for refusing to attend a business conference without 
her breast-feeding infant.31 
In 1998, for the first time, a court addressed the question whether 
a lactating employee should be protected under the ADA.32 In 
Martinez v. NBC a female employee unsuccessfully sued her 
employer, MSNBC, for insufficiently accommodating her need to 
pump breast milk at work.33 Martinez brought suit under the ADA 
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.34 The Southern District 
 
 27. 960 F. Supp. 1487, 1490-92 (D. Colo. 1997). 
 28. 650 F.2d 783, 783 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965)).  
 29. Id. at 785. The Fifth Circuit decided, however, that the school board should be given 
the opportunity to show that its rule prohibiting teachers from leaving the premises and from 
bringing their infants to work, as applied to breast -feeding mothers, furthered important state 
interests.  Id. at 787. 
 30. 411 A.2d 486 (Pa. 1979).  
 31. 997 F. Supp. 306, 309 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).  
 32. Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d 305. 
 33. Id. at 309. 
 34. Id. at 306.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/12
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of New York dismissed both of Martinez’s claims, holding that 
neither the ADA nor Title VII afforded her a remedy.35 Nevertheless, 
the court acknowledged that “the problems facing women who wish 
to bear children while pursuing challenging careers at the same time 
remain substantial.”36 
In Martinez the plaintiff left MSNBC on maternity leave and 
returned to work six months after giving birth to her son.37 After she 
resumed working, she chose to continue breast-feeding her infant.38 
Martinez used an electric breast pump to pump breast milk to feed 
her son when she was at work and could not nurse him.39 For three 
months after she returned from maternity leave, Martinez regularly 
pumped breast milk in an empty edit room at MSNBC’s studio.40 
After three months without incident, an employee tried to enter the 
edit room while she was breast-pumping.41 Martinez complained to 
MSNBC’s human resource department and rejected suggestions that 
she hang a “do not disturb” sign on the door.42 Martinez also began to 
experience difficulties concerning her work schedule and complained 
that male co-workers made offensive comments regarding her breast-
pumping.43 Martinez eventually left MSNBC and subsequently filed 
suit.44 
The court rejected Martinez’s Title VII claim, holding that her 
desire to pump breast milk was not “sex plus” discrimination.45 
Under Title VII, “sex plus” discrimination occurs “when a person is 
subjected to disparate treatment based not only on her sex, but on her 
sex considered in conjunction with a second characteristic.”46 The 
court reasoned that the “sex plus” theory does not apply where, as in 
Martinez, there was no corresponding subclass of members of the 
 
 35.  Id. at 308-11. 
 36. Id. at 306. 
 37. 49 F. Supp. 2d at 306-07.  
 38. Id. at 307. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
 42. 49 F. Supp. 2d at 307. 
 43. Id. Martinez desired a more regular schedule and refused to work weekends. Id. 
 44. Id. at 308. 
 45. Id. at 310-11. The court also summarily rejected Martinez’s claim of hostile work 
environment and retaliat ion under Title VII. Id. at 311. 
 46. Id.  
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opposite gender.47 
The court also rejected Martinez’s ADA claim by relying on court 
decisions holding that pregnancy and related conditions do not, 
absent unusual conditions, constitute disabilities under the ADA.48 
The court specifically quoted the Bond decision, which stated that “it 
is simply preposterous to contend a woman’s body is functioning 
abnormally because she is lactating.”49 
III. CRITIQUE OF MARTINEZ 
The ADA statutory requirements and a recent Supreme Court 
decision provide a framework for understanding the flaws in 
Martinez. The ADA prohibits discrimination50 in employment on the 
 
 47. Id. at 308-09 (citing Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo. Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 
1203 (10th Cir. 1997)).  
 48. 49 F. Supp. 2d at 308-09 (citing Lacoparra v. Pergament Home Ctrs., Inc., 982 F. 
Supp. 213, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Lehmuller v. Sag Harbor, 944 F. Supp. 1087, 1093 (E.D.N.Y. 
1996)).  
 49. Id. at 308-09 (quoting Bond, 997 F. Supp. at 311).  
 50. The ADA provides a statutory definition of discrimination. The definition of 
discrimination includes: 
(1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that 
adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of 
the disability of such applicant or employee; (2) participating in a contractual or other 
arrangement or relationship that has the effect of subjecting a covered entity’s 
qualified applicant or employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by 
this title (such relationship includes a relationship with an employment or referral 
agency, labor union, an organization providing fringe benefits to an employee of the 
covered entity, or an organization providing training and apprenticeship program); (3) 
utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration- (A) that have the effect of 
discrimination on the basis of disability; or (B) that perpetuate the discrimination of 
others who are subject to common administrative control; (4) excluding or otherwise 
denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability 
of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or 
association; (5)(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee 
who is a qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of 
such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental 
impairments of the employee or applicant; (6) using qualification standards, 
employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an 
individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the 
standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity is shown to be 
job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity; and 
(7) failing to select and administer tests concerning employment in the most effective 
manner to ensure that, when such test is administered to a job applicant or employee 
who has a disability that impairs sensory, manual, or speaking skills, such test results 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/12
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basis of disability by mandating: 
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified 
individual with a disability because of the disability of such 
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, 
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and 
privileges of employment.51 
The ADA defines a “qualified individual with a disability” as “an 
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the 
employment position that such individual holds or desires.”52 The 
ADA also imposes upon employers an affirmative obligation to 
“make reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 
limitations of a qualified individual” 53 unless doing so “would impose 
an undue hardship on the operation of the business of the covered 
entity.”54 
 
accurately reflect the skills, aptitude, or whatever other factor of such applicant or 
employee that such test purports to measure, rather than reflecting the impaired 
sensory, manual, or speaking skills of such employee or applicant (except where such 
skills are the factors that the test purports to measure) . 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (1994).  
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
 53. The ADA states that the term “reasonable accommodation” may include, but is not 
limited to: (1) “making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by 
individuals with disabilities,” (2) “restructuring” jobs, (3) allowing “part-time or modified work 
schedules,” (4) “reassignment to a vacant position,” (5) acquiring or modifying “equipment or 
devices,” (6) adjusting or modifying “examinations, training materials or policies,” or providing 
“qualified readers or interpreters.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A)-(B). The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations provide that “to determine the appropriate 
reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, 
interactive process with the qualified individual with a disability in need of the 
accommodation.” Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans wi th Disabilities Act,  29 
C.F.R. § 1630 (1999). The duty imposed under the ADA to provide reasonable 
accommodations to qualified individuals with disabilities is the same affirmative obligation that 
is imposed upon entities that are covered under the Rehabilitation Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 
(1994).  
 54. The ADA defines the phrase “covered entity” to mean “an employer, employment 
agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2). The 
federal government is specifically excluded from coverage under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111(5)(B). However, state and municipal employers are “covered entities” under the ADA. 
§ 12202. The term “employer” means “a person engaged in industry affecting commerce who 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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To state a claim under the ADA a plaintiff must have a disability, 
defined as “a physical or mental impairment which substantially 
limits one or more of the major life activities” of that individual.55 A 
“physical or mental impairment” is a physiological disorder or 
condition which affects one or more body systems, including the 
reproductive system.56 “Major life activities” include, but are not 
limited to, “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual 
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and 
working.”57 An individual is “substantially limited” by an impairment 
if she is “significantly restricted as to the condition, manner and 
duration under which she can perform a particular major life activity 
as compared to the condition, manner and duration under which the 
average person in the general population can perform that same major 
life activity.”58 When determining whether a disability “substantially 
limits” a person from performing a major life activity, courts 
consider: 1) the nature and severity of the impairment; 2) the duration 
and expected duration of the impairment; and 3) the permanent or 
long term impact, or the expected long term impact of, or resulting 
from, the impairment.59 
In addition to the statutory framework, in Bragdon v. Abbott the 
Supreme Court adopted a tripartite analysis for determining whether 
a mental or physical condition is a disability under the ADA.60 Under 
the first step of the analysis, the Court determined whether the 
plaintiff’s condition constituted a physical impairment.61 The second 
step of the analysis required the identification of the particular life 
activity that is impaired and a conclusion regarding whether the 
activity was a “major” life activity.62 Finally, the Court examined 
 
has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks 
in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person . . . .”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111(5)(A).  
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)A). 
 56. 29 C.F.R. § 1603.2(h)(1). 
 57. § 1630.2(i).  
 58. § 1630.2(j).  
 59. § 1630.2(j)(2). 
 60. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).  
 61. Id. at 624.  
 62. Id. at 638. The Court agreed with the court of appeals that “[t]he plain meaning of the 
word ‘major’ denotes comparative importance” and “suggest[s] that the touchstone for 
determining an activity’s inclusion under the statutory rubric is its significance.” Id. The Court 
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whether the plaintiff’s physical impairment “substantially limited” 
the asserted major life activity.63 
In light of the ADA framework and the Bragdon decision, the 
Martinez court incorrectly analyzed whether the ADA applies to 
breast-feeding employees. Instead of analyzing the conditions of 
pregnancy and lactation separately, the Martinez court apparently 
viewed pregnancy and lactation as a single, prolonged physical 
condition.64 
In support of its refusal to afford lactation ADA protection, the 
court stated that “[e]very court to consider the question to date has 
ruled that ‘pregnancy and related conditions do not, absent unusual 
conditions, constitute a [disability] under the ADA.’”65 The court 
then cited a number of cases which hold that pregnancy is not a 
disability under the ADA.66 However, the cited cases speak to the 
issue of pregnancy under the ADA, not lactation. Immediately 
following the case citations on pregnancy, the court quoted Bond’s 
belief that “it is simply preposterous to contend a woman’s body is 
functioning abnormally because she is lactating.”67 This immediate 
transition from cases on pregnancy to a quote on lactation highlights 
the court’s failure to draw a distinction between the two conditions. 
In sum, the Martinez court simply did not address the inherent 
differences between pregnancy and breast-feeding. By not addressing 
the physical distinctions between pregnancy and lactation, the court 
incorrectly concluded that the ADA does not protect breast-feeding 
employees. 
In light of the Martinez court’s failure to draw a distinction, the 
significant differences between pregnancy and lactation require 
 
also rejected the argument that “major life activity” is limited to “those aspects of a person’s 
life which have a public, economic, or daily character.” Id.  
 63. Id. at 637-41. 
 64. See infra  notes 65-67.  
 65. Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 308.  
 66. Id. at 308. See Lacoparra v. Pergament Home Ctr., Inc., 982 F.Supp. 213, 228 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that pregnancy is not a disability); Lehmuller v. Sag Harbor, 944 F. 
Supp. 1087, 1093 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that “normal pregnancy . . . does not impair any 
major life activity.”). The court also cited to an EEOC regulation excluding “conditions, such as 
pregnancy, that are not the result of a physiological disorder.” 49 F. Supp. at 309 (citing 29 
C.F.R. Pt. 1630 App. § 1630.2(h) (1999)).  
 67. Bond, 997 F. Supp. at 311.  
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discussion. Webster’s Dictionary defines being pregnant as 
“containing unborn young within the body.”68 In contrast, lactation is 
defined as “the secretion and yielding of milk.”69 Moreover, the 
condition of pregnancy ceases at the moment of the offspring’s birth, 
but the onset and cessation of lactation depends upon a number of 
variables. Childbirth automatically induces lactation but lactation 
does not depend upon pregnancy. In the absence of pregnancy, 
adopting mothers and wet nurses frequently rely upon the suckling of 
a baby to induce lactation.  
Furthermore, the physical impairments associated with pregnancy 
and lactation differ dramatically. A pregnant woman normally 
experiences a growth in girth and a variety of occasional discomforts. 
Absent any complications, however, the condition of pregnancy does 
not force a woman to substantially modify her lifestyle.  She is not 
yet limited by the constraints of a hungry infant and leaking body 
parts. In contrast, a lactating woman suffers from a constant and 
limiting impairment—the need to secrete milk. Without the 
opportunity to secrete milk, a lactating woman will experience breast 
pain and leakage.70 In addition, a breast-feeding infant demands 
frequent feedings which limit and affect a lactating mother’s lifestyle. 
Therefore, a breast-feeding employee possesses unique and disabling 
characteristics that a pregnant employee does not. 
IV. PROPOSALS 
A. Lactation Constitutes A Disability Under the ADA 
If one acknowledges the difference in condition between lactation 
and pregnancy, it is only logical to apply the ADA framework to 
lactation. The application of the ADA framework requires a 
 
 68. WEBSTER’S T HIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY  1788 (1993).  
 69. Id. at 1262.  
 70. See Jacobson v. Regent Assisted Living, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7680, at *1 (D.Or. 
Apr. 9, 1999). In Jacobson, the plaintiff’s employer refused to let her pump her breasts even 
though she was leaking, resulting in humiliation and breast pain. Id. at *7-*10. Despite the 
plaintiff’s request for a break, the employer refused to allow her any breaks and she was “forced 
to sit on a plane drenched in breast milk.” Id. at *12. Nevertheless, the district court granted 
summary judgment to the employer after finding credible evidence of shortcomings in the 
plaintiff’s job performance. Id. at *14-*15.   
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determination of whether lactation constitutes a “physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of [an] individual.”71 First, the condition of lactation fits 
within the definition of a physiological condition that affects one or 
more body systems, consistent with the ADA’s definition of 
“physical or mental impairment.”72 Second, the condition of lactation 
appears to affect a “major life activity” because it limits a woman’s 
mobility and ability to work by imposing constant physical 
constraints upon a woman, namely the need to release milk before 
experiencing pain and leakage.  Third, a woman is “substantially 
limited” by her lactating condition because she is “significantly 
restricted as to the condition, manner and duration under which she 
can perform a particular major life activity,”73 as compared to a non-
lactating individual performing the same activity. To illustrate this 
point, imagine two female employees in a conference call and one of 
the female employees is lactating. As the conference call drags on, 
the lactating employee will either require a break or will experience 
pain and the humiliation of leaking breasts, thus “significantly 
restricting” her working activity. In light of the Supreme Court’s 
recent pronouncement on the breadth of the ADA, lactation might 
constitute an impairment that substantially limits the major life 
activity of working, but lactation also substantially limits the major 
life activity of reproduction.74 
The duration of lactation will potentially affect the applicability of 
the ADA.75 Many courts and commentators characterize lactation as 
“temporary” and thus undeserving of ADA protection.76 However, 
the duration of lactation varies from individual to individual, and 
some women often lactate for over a year.77 Moreover, many 
 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994). See, e.g., supra  notes 51-60 and accompanying text.  
 72. 29 C.F.R. § 1603.2(h)(l) (1999).  
 73. 29 C.F.R. § 1630. 2(j).  
 74. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638. 
 75. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.  
 76. See Okoroki v. District of Columbia, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10704, at *3 (D.C. Cir. 
July 8, 1998).  
 77. Jo L. Freudenheim, Exposure to Breastmilk in Infancy and the Risk of Breast Cancer, 
EPIDEMIOLOGY, May 1994, at 324. Breast -feeding rates declined in the United States from the 
1950s through the 1970s. Id.  In the mid-1970s breast -feeding rates began to climb, reaching 
highs in the early 1980s. Id. Rates again began to decline in the mid-1980s. Statistics for 1997 
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disabilities that receive ADA protection vary in duration.78 Finally, 
the duration of the disability is only one factor that the courts 
consider.79  
Instead of applying the ADA, the majority of scholars suggest that 
the PDA should provide future lactation protection.80 However, a 
number of recent court decisions expressly and consistently denounce 
the possibility of PDA protection.81 Although the inherent purpose of 
the PDA is to level the playing field in employment, courts often 
refuse to grant PDA protection because of the uniqueness of female 
reproduction and the impossible task of identifying a similar male 
class. 
In contrast, the ADA could afford lactating employees the 
appropriate protection.  Based on the physical symptoms of lactation 
and its distinctions from pregnancy, lactation should fall under the 
ADA’s definition of disability.  Moreover, applying the ADA to a 
lactating mother satisfies a woman’s immediate need for 
accommodation. Under the PDA the remedy for gender inequality 
would remain elusive until a court fashioned a remedy. 
The potential protection of lactating employees is debated hotly 
and there are many different views as to the fundamental reasons for 
affording protection. Those who consider lactation a woman’s 
personal choice and those who consider lactation an unavoidable 
consequence of pregnancy critique differently the idea of protecting 
lactation.82 Critics that view lactation as a choice separate and apart 
from pregnancy believe that the impairment deserves neither PDA 
nor ADA protection.83 On the other hand, a number of scholars prefer 
to de-emphasize the distinction between pregnancy and lactation, 
thereby criticizing the idea that lactation is a decision entirely 
 
show that while 62.4% are breast -feeding their children in the hospital, only 26% are still 
breast-feeding at six months and 14.5% are breast -feeding at twelve months. Id. 
 78. See supra  note 59 and accompanying text.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Litigating Against Employment Penalties for 
Pregnancy, Breast-feeding and Childcare, 44 VILL. L. REV. 355 (1999).  
 81. See supra note 25.  
 82. Barrash , 846 F.2d 927 (characterizing the choice to breast -feed as a personal, private 
indulgence).  
 83. Id. at 930.  
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separate from the choice to have a child.84 Scholars who believe that 
lactation is an unavoidable result of pregnancy contend that a 
woman’s body, not her conscious mind, makes the decision to lactate 
when she gives birth.85 Therefore, a woman must choose to interrupt 
the flow of milk instead of inducing it.86 The scholars on this side of 
the debate usually support PDA protection.87  This theoretical debate 
predominantly emerges in the context of the PDA because the PDA 
protects “medical conditions” related to pregnancy,88 and many argue 
that breast-feeding constitutes a “related medical condition” and thus 
demands protection. 
However, the debate over a mother’s choice or absence of choice 
in lactation possesses limited importance in the context of the ADA. 
The important distinction lies in the distinctiveness of the symptoms 
associated with each of the two physical conditions, not whether 
lactation is a body’s automatic response to childbirth. According to 
the Supreme Court, the issue of personal choice must not enter a 
decision to apply the ADA to a particular impairment.89 In Bragdon 
the Court held that “in the end, the disability definition does not turn 
on personal choice. When significant limitations result from the 
impairment, the definition is met even if the difficulties are not 
insurmountable.”90 Therefore, after the Bragdon decision, the debate 
regarding whether lactation is a choice or an unavoidable 
consequence of pregnancy appears moot in the context of the ADA. 
Instead, the primary question is whether or not lactation, as an 
impairment, constitutes a disability. 
Some feminist scholars probably will consider the idea of labeling 
 
 84. Judith G. Greenberg, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act: Legitimating Discrimination 
Against Pregnant Women in the Workforce, 50 ME. L. REV. 225, 230 n.29 (1998). Greenberg 
asks: “What about the physical changes that come with lactation or the suppression of lactation? 
Are they not medical conditions related to pregnancy? The line between “biological” and “non-
biological” effects of pregnancy is simply not self-evident in the way [courts] would have us 
believe it is.” Id. at 230. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id.  
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).  
 89. Bragdon, 524 U.S. 624 (holding that HIV infection, even in the asymptomatic phase, 
is an impairment which substantially limits the major life activity of reproduction).  
 90. Id. at 638.  
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lactation a disability offensive.91 A number of feminist scholars argue 
that it is derogatory to label  pregnancy as a disability and that doing 
so will lead to further stereotyping of women.92 Therefore, because 
these scholars criticize the labeling of pregnancy as a disability, they 
likewise might find fault in the labeling of lactation as a disability.93 
However, the law is not a prisoner of social mores and must not 
hesitate to act in decisions of great social importance. Contrary to the 
popular feminist position, labeling lactation a “disability” will not 
hinder advances towards gender equality nor will the label categorize 
lactation as “abnormal.”94 Unfortunately, courts and scholars hesitate 
to label lactation a disability because they assume that the label 
“disability” requires a finding of “abnormality.”95  
Ironically, the word “abnormal,” or merely the idea of 
“abnormality,” does not exist in the language of the ADA. The ADA 
language focuses on the symptoms of a disability and its effect upon 
an individual.96 Instead of requiring an “abnormality,” the ADA 
specifically requires a finding of an “impairment” which is defined as 
a “physiological condition.”97 Therefore, any difficulty in labeling 
lactation a disability should not arise from a reluctance to label 
lactation “abnormal” because the ADA plainly does not require such 
a finding. 
Perhaps the theories of Professor Robert Burgdorf best explain the 
reasons for reading the word “abnormal” into the statute.98 Professor 
Burgdorf, who drafted the first ADA bill, argued that the ADA 
 
 91. See Andrew Weissmann, Note, Sexual Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 690, 710 (1983).  
 92. Id.  
 93. See generally John D. Gibson, Note, Childbearing and Childrearing: Feminists and 
Reform , 73 VA. L. REV. 1145, 1171 (1987). In analyzing several feminist views, Gibson 
presents the views of Catherine MacKinnon. Catherine MacKinnon criticizes the idea of 
pregnancy as a disability because doing so assumes that pregnancy and related conditions are a 
disruptive intrusion into the male workplace rather than a positive fact of life which the 
workplace should be restructured to accommodate.  CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 121 (1979). 
 94. Gibson, supra note 93, at 1173.  
 95. Bond, 997 F. Supp. at 311. 
 96. See supra  notes 50-59 and accompanying text. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from Disability 
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of 
Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 411 (1997). 
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possesses a “simple and profound” central premise.99 He described 
the premise as: “people denominated as ‘disabled’ are just people . . .. 
Paradoxically, commentators, enforcement agencies and the courts, 
with manifest good intentions, have frequently interpreted and 
applied these laws in ways that reinforce a diametrically opposite 
premise-that people with disabilities are significantly different, 
special and need exceptional status and protection.”100 
Furthermore, labeling lactation a disability will not reinforce 
gender prejudices or foster discrimination.101 Rather, labeling 
lactation a disability will potentially reverse the historical tendency to 
minimize the impairment women experience when they lactate. By 
recognizing and validating the impairment, women will not suffer 
increased gender discrimination, but rather will receive increased 
respect in the workplace. Finally, mandating accommodation 
legitimizes the importance of a woman’s right to breast-feed and 
forces an employer to appropriately respect her condition. 
B. Accommodation Under The ADA 
As a number of states and the federal government attempt to 
legislate a woman’s right to breast-feed, the law appears increasingly 
complex and embroiled. On the one hand, popular sentiment and 
medical findings encourage women to breast-feed.102 On the other 
hand, the demands of a woman’s job can negate her choice all 
together. Moreover, the current state of the law may fail to clearly 
protect a woman’s right to breast-feed as it simultaneously fails to 
provide employers with appropriate means for accommodating their 
lactating employees. Even the Martinez court, who mistakenly 
applied the ADA to the condition of lactation, acknowledged that 
affording reasonable accommodation to lactating women could be 
 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id.  
 101. See Greenberg, supra  note 84, at 245.  Greenberg argues that labeling female 
reproduction a disability “invokes a common stereotyped image of pregnant women—women 
who because of their condition are too tired, too large, or too emotional to carry on their normal 
activities.” Id. 
 102. See supra  note 4 and accompanying text.  
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desirable.103 The Martinez court admitted “[t]his of course is not to 
say that a statute requiring employers to afford reasonable 
accommodation to women engaged in breast feeding or breast 
pumping would be undesirable.”104 
Therefore, the easiest and most uniform way to protect the rights 
of working mothers and private employers is to provide protection for 
lactating employees under the ADA. Moreover, application of the 
ADA would help to curb and clarify the current proliferation of 
inconsistent state legislation regarding breast-feeding. 
Unfortunately, courts might respond to Martinez by rubber-
stamping a denial of a nursing mother’s ADA claim instead of 
independently evaluating the appropriateness of the ADA to the 
condition of lactation. However, if a court independently evaluates 
lactation apart from the condition of pregnancy, it should conclude 
that the ADA affords an appropriate remedy-accommodation to a 
breast-feeding employee.  For example, accommodation could easily 
take the form of mandated private lactation breakrooms on the 
employer’s premises that are designated exclusively as lactation 
stations.105 Accommodation sounds like a vague remedy, but in light 
of the past success of the ADA, it would be practical to implement.106  
CONCLUSION 
Attitudes, enforced by statutes interpreted either correctly or 
incorrectly by the courts and public, stand as obstacles for women 
who want to breast-feed their children. These misconceived attitudes 
conflict with increasing awareness that breast-feeding is the optimal 
method to feed infants.107 Furthermore, it sends a message to nursing 
 
 103. Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 309.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Perhaps organizations such as the American Association of Pediatrics could issue 
suggestive break schedules in keeping with the needs of the woman and infant. 
 106. See, e.g., Max Schulz, Disability Rules Moving in on Smaller Businesses, WASH . 
T IMES, Aug. 28, 1994, at B3; Ron A. Vassel, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The 
Cost, Uncertainty and Inefficiency, 13 J.L. & COM. 397 (1994); Stevens B. Epstein, In Search 
of a Bright Line: Determining When an Employer’s Financial Hardship Becomes “Undue” 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 391, 394 n.11 (1995). 
 107. See Celia Farber, HIV and Breast-feeding; The Fears. The Misconceptions. The 
Facts., 90 MOTHERING 65 (1998).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/12
p341Von Rohr.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000]  Lactation Litigation 359 
 
 
mothers that they can choose to stay at home or bottle -feed, but do 
not attempt to work and breast-feed their children. 
Labeling lactation as a disability under the ADA formally 
recognizes the physical constraints lactation imposes upon a woman’s 
body and provides a coherent framework for employers and 
employees.  If we as a society recognize the importance of a 
woman’s choice to breast-feed and a woman’s choice to work, then 
we must provide the accommodations necessary to facilitate both 
choices. Society as a whole must bear this burden instead of 
regarding accommodation as solely a women’s issue. In sum, 
labeling lactation a disability under the ADA will further the goal of 
gender equality by providing assistance for women who choose to 
breast-feed their infants and also support their families. 
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